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Abstract. We analyze the security of the two-way continuous-variable quantum key
distribution protocol in reverse reconciliation against general two-mode attacks, which
represent all accessible attacks at fixed channel parameters. Rather than against one
specific attack model, the expression of secret key rates of the two-way protocol are
derived against all accessible attack models. It is found that there is an optimal
two-mode attack to minimize the performance of the protocol in terms of both secret
key rates and maximal transmission distances. We identify the optimal two-mode
attack, give the specific attack model of the optimal two-mode attack and show the
performance of the two-way protocol against the optimal two-mode attack. Even under
the optimal two-mode attack, the performances of two-way protocol are still better than
the corresponding one-way protocol, which shows the advantage of making a double
use of the quantum channel and the potential of long-distance secure communication
using two-way protocol.
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is one of the most practical applications
in the field of quantum information. Its goal is to establish a secure key between
two legitimate partners, usually named Alice and Bob. Continuous-variable quantum
key distribution (CV-QKD) [3, 4, 5] has attracted much attention in the past few
years [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] mainly because it only uses standard telecom components. A CV-
QKD protocol based on Gaussian-modulated coherent states [10, 11] has been proved
to be secure against arbitrary general attacks [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] and experimentally
demonstrated [6, 18, 19, 20, 21].
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To enhance the tolerable excess noise of CV-QKD, compared to the typical one-way
schemes, the two-way CV-QKD protocol was proposed [22]. Afterward, a more feasible
two-way CV-QKD protocol was proposed by replacing Alice’s displacement operation
with a beam splitter, which leads to a protocol that is easier to analyze when considering
channel estimation [23]. In standard CV-QKD protocols the quantum communication is
one way, i.e., quantum systems are sent from Alice to Bob. While in two-way protocols,
this process is bidirectional, with the systems transformed by Alice and sent back to
Bob. The use of two-way quantum communication can increase the secure key rate,
transmission distance, and the robustness to noise [22, 23]. As a result, bosonic channels
which are too noisy for one-way protocols may become secure for two-way protocols [5].
However, when comparing the performance of two-way CV-QKD protocol with
one-way protocol in numerical simulations, all of the works assumed the eavesdropper
performs two independent attacks [22, 23, 27] or give a specific attack model [25, 26].
It makes us to wander does the outperformance of two-way protocol against a specific
attack mean two-way protocol really have advantages than one-way protocol? Do we
make a fair comparison? Or it is just because the chosen attack model is powerless?
Recently, it is very interesting to see that the security of the original two-
way CV-QKD protocol against two-mode attacks has been studied assuming direct
reconciliation [28], and the general immunity and superadditivity of the original protocol
has also been studied [29]. Inspired by the method of [28], in this paper, we analyze the
security of the modified two-way CV-QKD protocol in reverse reconciliation against
general two-mode attacks, including two independent attacks, all separable attacks
and all entangled attacks. Normally, reverse reconciliation is more useful than direct
reconciliation in practice [5]. Against all accessible two-mode attacks, the expression of
secret key rates of two-way CV-QKD protocol using coherent states are derived under
reverse reconciliation. Then we evaluate and compare the performance of the two-way
protocol against different attacks and identify the optimal attack model, resulting the
lowest secret key rate, for the eavesdropper at different transmission distance. We also
show the performance of the two-way CV-QKD protocol against the optimal two-mode
attack. Finally, the performances of the two-way CV-QKD protocol against the optimal
attack are compared with the performances of the one-way version of the scheme and
show that the two-way CV-QKD protocol still achieves higher secret key rate than
one-way protocol. Thus, the two-way protocol is still able to distribute secret keys in
communication lines which are too noisy for the corresponding one-way protocol.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we review the basic notions of the
entanglement-based scheme of the two-way CV-QKD protocol and the general two-
mode attacks and identify different type of attacks. In Sec. 3, we derive the expression
of secret key rates of the coherent-state based two-way CV-QKD protocol. In Sec. 4,
the simulation results against different attacks are provided and the performances of
the two-way protocol against the optimal attack are compared with one-way protocol
to show the advantage of two-way scheme. Our conclusions are drawn in Sec. 5.
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Figure 1. (Color online) The entanglement-based scheme of two-way CV-QKD
protocol using Gaussian-modulated coherent states against two-mode attacks, where
the quantum channel is fully controlled by Eve. However, Eve has no access to the
apparatuses in Alice’s and Bob’s stations.
2. Entanglement-based model of two-way CV-QKD protocols against
two-mode attacks
In this section, we first present basic notions of the entanglement-based scheme of the
two-way CV-QKD protocol using coherent states. Then we describe the general two-
mode attacks and identify different type of attacks.
2.1. Entanglement-based model of two-way CV-QKD protocols
The entanglement-based scheme of the two-way CV-QKD protocol using coherent states
is illustrated in Fig. 1 and can be described as follows:
Step 1: Bob initially prepares an EPR pair (EPR1 with variance VB, where the shot
noise variance is normalized to 1), keeps the mode B1 and sends the other mode B2 to
Alice through the channel where Eve may perform her attack.
Step 2: Alice prepares another EPR pair (EPR2 with variance VA). She keeps the
mode A1 and measures it using heterodyne detection to get the variables xA1 and pA1 .
She then couples mode A2 and the received mode Ain from Bob with a beam splitter
(transmittance: TA ∈ [0, 1]). Alice then sends mode Aout back to Bob where Eve may
perform her attack again. Alice measures another mode A3 with homodyne detection
for parameter estimation [23].
Step 3: Bob measures his original mode B1 using heterodyne detection to get the vari-
ables xB1 and pB1 . He also measures the received mode B3 with heterodyne detection
to get xB3 and pB3 .
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Step 4: Bob uses xBx = xB3 − kxB1 and pBp = pB3 − kpB1 to construct the estima-
tor to Alice’s corresponding variable xA1 and pA1, where k is the parameter used to
optimize Bob’s estimator of Alices corresponding value. Then Alice and Bob proceed
with classical data postprocessing including reconciliation and privacy amplification.
Here we use reverse reconciliation [18].
The most general eavesdropping strategy of two-way CV-QKD protocol is coherent
attacks, which involve a unitary applied to all modes over all uses of the protocol.
However, this could be reduced to collective attacks by assuming that Alice and Bob
perform random permutations on their data [15]. When the eavesdropper perform
collective attacks, she interacts independently and identically with each quantum
signal over every uses. In the entanglement-based representation of two-way CV-QKD
protocol, this means that the joint state ρAnBn has an identical and independently
distributed (i.i.d.) structure ρAnBn = ρ
⊗n
AB, where n amounts the number of the uses of
the protocol.
What’s more, the most general collective attack against two-way CV-QKD protocol
is a joint attack involving two channels, the forward and backward channels. In each
use of the protocol, Eve could intercept the two modes, one is the output of Bob side in
the forward channel (mode B2 in Fig. 1) and the other is the output of Alice side in the
backward channel (mode Aout in Fig. 1), and make them intercept with an ensemble of
ancillary vacuum modes via a general unitary U . The remaining modes are stored in a
quantum memory which will be measured at the end of the protocol.
The description of this attack can be further simplified. Since the protocol is based
on the Gaussian modulation, its optimal eavesdropping attack is based on a Gaussian
unitary U . Thus, the security of the protocol can be reduced to studying a two-mode
Gaussian attack against two channels, which is depicted in Fig. 1.
2.2. Two-mode attack strategy
In this two-mode Gaussian attack, the two output modes, B2 and Aout, are mixed with
two ancillary modes, E1 and E2, by two beam splitters with transmissivities T1 and T2,
respectively. These ancillary modes belong to a reservoir of ancillas (E1, E2 and an extra
set e) which is globally described by a pure Gaussian state. The reduced state ρE1E2 of
the injected ancillas is a correlated thermal state with zero mean and covariance matrix
in the normal form
γE1E2 =
(
VE1 · I2 CE1E2
CE1E2 VE2 · I2
)
, (1)
where VE1 and VE2 are the variances of the thermal noise affecting each channel,
CE1E2 = diag (Cx, Cp) is the correlation parameters between two ancillas. The various
parameters VE1, VE2 , Cx and Cp must satisfy the physical constraints [9, 30, 31, 32]:
γE1E2 > 0, ν− ≥ 1, (2)
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Figure 2. (Color online) Correlation plane for different types of attacks under fixed
variances VE1 = VE2 = 3, where the inner are corresponds to separable attacks, while
the two peripheral areas correspond to entangled attacks. The number points represent
the specific attacks: point (1) represents Independent Attack ; point (2), (3), (4) and (5)
represent Separable Attack (Cmaxsep = 2); point (6) and (7) represent Entangled Attack
(Cmaxent =
√
8) .
where the positivity γE1E2 > 0 is equivalent to the positivity of the principal minors
of the matrix of Eq. 1, ν− =
√
0.5
(
∆(γE1E2)−
√
∆(γE1E2)
2 − 4 det γE1E2
)
, and
∆ (γE1E2) := V
2
E1
+ V 2E2 + 2CxCp.
In the two-way CV-QKD protocols, normally the excess noises of two channels are
fixed, which means the variances, VE1 and VE2 , are fixed for every transmissivity T1 and
T2. Thus, the remaining degrees of freedom in the two-mode Gaussian attack are the
correlation parameters Cx and Cp, which can be represented as a point on a correlation
plane. Each point of this plane describes an attack. Among all these accessible attacks,
those satisfying the further condition
ν˜− ≥ 1, (3)
are separable attacks (γE1E2 seperable), while those violating the condition of Eq. 3 are
entangled attacks (γE1E2 entangled), where ν˜− =
√
0.5
(
∆˜ (γE1E2)−
√
∆˜(γE1E2)
2 − 4 det γE1E2
)
,
and ∆˜ (γE1E2) := V
2
E1
+ V 2E2 − 2CxCp. Fig. 2 are a numerical representation of the cor-
relation plane under fixed variances: VE1 = 3 and VE2 = 3. Then we can identify the
following attacks: Separable Attack, Independent Attack and Entangled Attack, which
is detailed describe in Ref. [9, 32]. Here we just give the some basic knowledge which
will be used in the following analysis. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the point (1) represents
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the independent attack; the point (2), (3), (4) and (5) represent four specific separable
attacks; the point (6) and (7) represent two specific entangled attacks.
2.3. Security analysis of two-way CV-QKD protocol against two-mode attacks
In this subsection, we will derive the secure bound of the two-way protocol using coherent
states against two-mode Gaussian attacks.
From the information-theoretic perspective, the asymptotic secret key rate K
against two-mode Gaussian attacks in reverse reconciliation is given by [33]
K = βI (A : B)− χ (B : E) , (4)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, I(A : B) is the classical mutual information
between Alice and Bob, χ(B : E) is the the Holevo bound between Eve and Bob [34]
χ (B : E) = S (ρE)−
∑
mB
p (mB)S (ρ
mB
E ), (5)
where S(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy of the quantum state ρ, mB is Bob’s
measurement result, and it can take the form mB = xB for homodyne detection or
the form mB = xB , pB for heterodyne detection. p (mB) is the probability density of
the measurement result, ρmBE is the corresponding state of Eve’s ancillary conditioned
on Bob’s measurement result.
The overall state can be described by the covariance matrix, which is defined by
γij = Tr [ρˆ {(rˆi − di) , (rˆj − dj)}] , (6)
where rˆ2i−1 = xˆi, rˆ2i = pˆi, di = 〈rˆi〉 = Tr [ρˆrˆi], ρˆ is the density matrix, and denotes the
anticommutator. Before channel transmission, the covariance matrix γB1A1A2B2 is

VB · I 0 · I 0 · I
√
(V 2B − 1) · σz
0 · I VA · I
√
(V 2A − 1) · σz 0 · I
0 · I
√
(V 2A − 1) · σz VA · I 0 · I√
(V 2B − 1) · σz 0 · I 0 · I VB · I


(7)
where VB is the variance of EPR1 and VA is the variance of EPR2. The channel
transmission relationship are as follow,

rAin =
√
T1rB2 +
√
1− T1rE1
rA3 = −
√
1− ηrAin +
√
ηrA2
rAout =
√
ηrAin +
√
1− ηrA2
rB3 =
√
T2rAout +
√
1− T2rE2
(8)
After two-mode Gaussian attacks, the covariance matrix γB1A1A2B2 is changed into
γB1A1A3B3 , which is given by

VBI 0 −T ′CBσz √ηTCBσz
0 VAI
√
ηCAσz T
′CAσz
−T ′CBσz √ηCAσz VA3 CA3B3√
ηTCBσz T
′CAσz CA3B3 VB3

 (9)
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where the forward and backward channel are assumed to have identical transmissitivity
T1 = T2 = T and same excess noise VE1 = VE2 = VE. The parameters
T ′ =
√
T (1− η), CA =
√
(V 2A − 1), CB =
√
(V 2B − 1). The matrices
VA3 = [ηVA + (1− η) (TVB + (1− T )VE)] I, VB3 = diag
(
V xB3 , V
p
B3
)
and CA3B3 =
diag
(
CxA3B3 , C
p
A3B3
)
, which is given by


V xB3 = V
′ + 2Cx (1− T )
√
Tη
V
p
B3
= V ′ + 2Cp (1− T )
√
Tη
CxA3B3 = C
′ − Cx (1− T )
√
1− η
C
p
A3B3
= C ′ − Cp (1− T )
√
1− η
(10)
where V ′ = T (1− η) VA+T 2ηVB+{1− T [1− η (1− T )]} VE and C ′ =
√
Tη (1− η)VA−
T
√
Tη (1− η)VB − (1− T )
√
Tη (1− η)VE
For two-way CV-QKD protocol using coherent states, Alice measures mode A1 to
get the variables xA1 , pA1 using heterodyne detectors. While Bob measures modes B1
and B3 to get the variables xB1 , pB1 and xB3 , pB3 using heterodyne detectors. Then he
uses the estimators xBx = xB3 − kxB1 , pBp = pB3 − kpB1 to construct xA1 , pA1 at the
same time.
The classical mutual information between Alice and Bob becomes
I (A : B) = Ix (A : B) + Ip (A : B)
=1
2
log
VA1x
VA1x|Bx
+ 1
2
log
VA1p
VA1p|Bp
, (11)
where VA1x = VA1p =
1
2
(VA1 + 1), VA1x|xBx =
1
2
(
VA1|xBx + 1
)
and VA1p|pBp =
1
2
(
VA1|pBp + 1
)
.
The calculation of χ (B : E) is more complex. For heterodyne detection, we have
χx (B : E) = S (E) − S
(
E|xBx , pBp
)
. Assuming Eve is able to purify Alice and Bob’s
system, we have S (E) = S (B1A1A3B3) and S
(
E|xBx , pBp
)
= S
(
B1A1A3B3|xBx , pBp
)
.
The S (B1A1A3B3) and S
(
B1A1A3B3|xBx , pBp
)
can be calculated by the symplectic
eigenvalues of the covariance matrices γB1A1A3B3 and γB1A1A3B3|xBx ,pBp , which is derived
from the following method.
Given an arbitrary N -mode covariance matrix γ, there exists a symplectic matrix
S such that
γ = Sγ⊕ST , γ⊕ =
N⊕
k=1
λk · I2, (12)
where the diagonal matrix γ⊕ is called the Williamson form of γ, and the N positive
quantities λk are called the symplectic eigenvalues of γ [5]. Here the symplectic spectrum
{λk}Nk=1 can be easily computed as the standard eigenspectrum of the matrix |iΩγ|
[5], where the modulus must be understood in the operational sense. Here Ω is the
symplectic form Ω =
N⊕
k=1
[
0 1
−1 0
]
.
The covariance matrix γB1A1A3B3 is given by Eq. 9, while the derivation of
γB1A1A3B3|xBx ,pBp need to concern Bob’s post-processing strategy. In coherent-state based
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protocol, Bob uses xBx = xB3 − kxB1 and pBp = pB3 − kpB1 to construct xA1 and pA1 at
the same time, where k =
√
0.5T 2η VB−1
VB+1
. Thus, we are not able to derive γB1A1A3B3|xBx
directly. As developed in [25], we transform modes B3x and B1x into modes Bx and
B4 with a CNOT gate Γx, and transform modes B3p and B1p into modes Bp and B5
with a CNOT gate Γp. We should emphasize that this is a virtual operation in the
entanglement-based scheme, while in its corresponding Prepare & Measurement scheme
Bob does not perform such operations.
Since we have the covariance matrices γB1A1A3B3 and γB1A1A3B3|xBx ,pBp , we could
calculate the symplectic eigenvalues of them by the method mentioned before. Thus,
the expression for Eq. 5 can be further simplified as follows:
χ (B : E) =
4∑
i=1
G
(λi − 1
2
)
−
8∑
i=5
G
(λi − 1
2
)
, (13)
where G(x) = (x + 1) log2(x + 1)− x log2 x, λ1−4 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the
covariance matrix γB1A1A3B3 and λ5−8 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance
matrix γB1A1A3B3|xBx ,pBp .
3. Optimal two-mode attack strategy
In this section, to find the optimal two-mode attack strategy against two-way CV-QKD
protocols, the performance of two-way CV-QKD protocols are compared under different
types two-mode attack strategy.
We first analyze the secret key rates of the protocol against all accessible attacks
at fixed transmission distance d = 10km, 20km, 30km, where we only put the result at
d = 10km here and put the results at d = 20km, 30km in the appendix. The parameters
affecting the value of the secret key rate are the reconciliation efficiency β, the variance
of Alice’s and Bob’s modulation: (VA− 1) and (VB − 1), the transmittance of the beam
splitter at Alice’s side η and the transmission efficiency T . The parameters VA, VB, β,
η and υel are fixed in all simulations. Here, we choose the variance VA = VB = 20,
β = 1, η = 0.75 as the value of the beam splitter transmittance at Alice’s side and
channel noise ε = 0.2. As illustrated in Fig. 3 (a), different colors correspond to
different values of the secret key rate, where color red corresponds to higher value
of the rate, while color blue corresponds to lower value of the rate. It is found that
the secret key rate is symmetric with respect to the bisector Cx = Cp, which is
coincident with the security analysis in Sec.2.3. What’s more, in order to be more
clear, we plot the specific cases where Cx = −Cp and Cx = Cp in Fig. 3 (b) and (c),
respectively. The minimum key rate associated with the optimal attack correspond to
the two-mode symmetric separable attack with Cx = Cp = C
10km
opt = 0.0078 when we
fix the channel excess noise ε = 0.2. The situation at distance d = 20km, 30km is
illustrated in the appendix. The optimal attack is the two-mode symmetric separable
attack Cx = Cp = C
20km
opt = 0.0073 at d = 20km, and is the two-mode symmetric
separable attack with Cx = Cp = C
30km
opt = 0.0039 at d = 30km
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Figure 3. (Color online) (a) Secret key rates of two-way CV-QKD protocol using
coherent states against all accessible attacks under 10km distance, where different
colors correspond to different values of the rate. The secret key rate is symmetric with
respect to the bisector Cx = Cp. (b) Specific case of the left figure where Cx = Cp. (c)
Specific case of the left figure where Cx = −Cp. Here we use the reconciliation efficiency
β = 0.95 [6], modulation variance VA = VB = 20, ε = 0.2 and η = 0.75. Point (1)
represents Independent Attack ; point (2), (3), (4) and (5) represent Separable Attack ;
point (6) and (7) represent Entangled Attack. The various attacks (1) - (7) are classified
in Sec. 2 and displayed in Fig. 2.
Depends on the results of each distance, we plot the normalized correlation
parameters of the optimal two-mode attack as a function of the distance under different
channel excess noise ε = 0.2, 0.15, 0.1, 0.05, 0.02 in Fig. 4. The optimal two-mode
attack always occurs at the case where the correlation parameter Cx is equal to
Cp. The normalized correlation parameters C
′
x is defined as C
′
x = Cx
/
Cmaxsep , where
C ′x = −1, 0, 1 correspond the case of points (5), (1), (4) in Fig. 2. Thus, depending
on Eq. 1, the covariance matrix of the injected ancillas of the optimal two-mode attack
becomes
γE1E2 =
(
VE · I2 Copt · I2
Copt · I2 VE · I2
)
, (14)
where VE = 1 +
Tε
1−T
.
This covariance matrix represents a specific two-mode attack model, which is
illustrated in Fig. 5. Eve initially prepares two EPR pairs (EPR1 with variance
V1 = VE + Copt and EPR2 with variance V2 = VE − Copt), keeps one mode of each EPR
pairs and then she couples the other mode of the two EPR pairs with a 50 : 50 beam
splitter. The output modes of the beam splitter, mode E1 and E2, are two ancillary
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Figure 4. (Color online) The normalized correlation parameters of the optimal
two-mode attacks as a function of the distance under different channel excess noise
ε = 0.2, 0.15, 0.1, 0.05, 0.02. Here we use the modulation variance V = VA = VB = 20
and η = 0.75.
injected modes of two-mode attack. Finally, Eve mixes modes E1 and E2 with the
modes in the forward and backward channels, by two beam splitters with transmissivity
T , respectively. The remaining modes are stored in the quantum memory which will be
measured at the end of the protocol. We note that, no matter what specific model of
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Figure 5. (Color online) The specific two-mode attack model of the optimal two-mode
attack strategy corresponding to Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Eq. 14, where Eve prepares two
EPR pairs to generate two ancillary injected modes into the forward and backward
channel.
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Figure 6. (Color online) (a) A comparison among the tolerable excess noise
as a function of the transmission distance for two-way CV-QKD protocol against
the optimal two-mode attacks and one-way CV-QKD protocol when using ideal
reconciliation efficiency β = 1. (b) A comparison among the tolerable excess noise
as a function of the transmission distance for two-way CV-QKD protocol against
the optimal two-mode attacks and one-way CV-QKD protocol when using practical
reconciliation efficiency β = 0.95 [6]. Here we use the modulation variance V = VA =
VB = 20 and η = 0.75.
Eve is, the optimal two-mode attack has the feature that VE1 = VE2, Cx = Cp, which is
symmetric for x-quadrature and p-quadrature.
4. Outperfomance of two-way CV-QKD protocols
In the following, we compare the two-way CV-QKD protocol with their one-way
counterpart to examine whether two-way protocol remains advantageous when the
optimal two-mode attack strategy is used against the two-way protocol.
To reveal the advantage of two-way CV-QKD protocol more explicitly, the
relationship between the tolerable excess noise and the transmission distance are shown
in Fig. 6. When using ideal reconciliation efficiency β = 1, the upper limit of the
tolerable excess noise of two-way CV-QKD protocol is almost the double of the upper
limit of the one-way protocol at short transmission distance. As the transmission
distance increases, this advantage would be reduced. But the tolerable excess noise of the
two-way protocol is still higher than that of the one-way protocol. As the reconciliation
efficiency decreases from an ideal value to a more practical one [6], the advantage of
two-way protocols still holds and becomes more obvious. The results in Fig. 6 (b) show
that the two-way CV-QKD could tolerate more channel excess noise than the one-way
protocol.
Thus, from the above discussion, it is found that even under the optimal two-
mode attacks, which cause lower secret key rate and shorter transmission distance, the
performances of the two-way protocol are still better than the one-way protocol. The
two-way protocol is able to distribute secret keys in communication lines which are too
noisy for the one-way protocol.
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5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze the security of two-way CV-QKD protocol against general two-
mode attacks, including two independent attacks, all separable attacks and all entangled
attacks. Against all accessible two-mode attacks, the expression of secret key rates of
the two-way CV-QKD protocol is derived under the reverse reconciliation. Then we
evaluate and compare the performance of the two-way protocol against different attacks
and it is found that there is an optimal two-mode attack to minimize the performance of
the protocol in terms of both key rates and maximal transmission distances. We identify
the optimal two-mode attack, give the specific attack model of the optimal two-mode
attack and show the performance of the two-way protocol against the optimal two-mode
attack.
The performance of the two-way CV-QKD protocol against the optimal attack are
compared with the performances of the one-way version of the scheme and show that
the two-way CV-QKD protocols still achieve higher secret key rate and tolerate more
excess noise than one-way protocol, which shows the advantage of making a double use
of the quantum channel and addressing the question - whether the two-way protocol
really have advantages than one-way protocol?
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Appendix A. Optimal two-mode attack strategy at different distance
In this appendix, we show the secret key rates of the two-way CV-QKD protocol against
all accessible attacks at fixed transmission distance d = 20km, 30km. The parameters
we use here keep the same with Sec. 3. As illustrated in Fig. A1 (a) and Fig. A2 (a),
different colors correspond to different values of the secret key rate, where color red
regions correspond to higher values of the rate, while color blue regions correspond to
lower values of the rate. What’s more, we also plot the specific cases where Cx = −Cp
and Cx = Cp in Fig. A1 (b), (c), and Fig. A2 (b), (c), respectively. The minimal
key rate associated with the optimal attack correspond to the two-mode symmetric
separable attack Cx = Cp = C
20km
opt = 0.0073 at d = 20km and correspond to the
two-mode symmetric separable attack Cx = Cp = C
30km
opt = 0.0039 at d = 30km.
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Figure A1. (Color online) (a) Secret key rates of two-way CV-QKD protocol using
coherent states against all accessible attacks under 20km distance. (b) Specific case
of the left figure where Cx = Cp. (c) Specific case of the left figure where Cx = −Cp.
Here we use the same parameters as in Fig. 4.
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Figure A2. (Color online) (a) Secret key rates of two-way CV-QKD protocol using
coherent states against all accessible attacks under 30km distance. (b) Specific case
of the left figure where Cx = Cp. (c) Specific case of the left figure where Cx = −Cp.
Here we use the same parameters as in Fig. 4.
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